A N Dhaksar
This description also points to the commonality in the history of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, in a wider background of time and space, that also deserves present recollection
Last month's celebration of the 50th anniversary of Bangladesh's independence, brought back some memories of those times. Here they are, for those whose interest may have been aroused by Prime Minister Modi's recent visit to our neighbouring country on that occasion. Fifty years ago, in 1971, I was in the Indian Foreign Service and assigned as Political Counselor in India's permanent mission to the UN, at New York. My work involved following current events and the role of the UN. The ongoing tension and conflict in then East Pakistan was a part of that job. This became especially so in the heated environment of late 1971 for the subcontinent. The Cold War was at full blast, the US was seeking a historic opening with China, and India was steadfastly maintaining its policy of non-alignment, while grappling with massive refugee inflows fleeing the genocide inflicted by the Pakistani army on its own population in the East.
Much has been written about this conflict. Here are some key vignettes from the sidelines of action at the UN. As the situation escalated, with rising pressure at the UN from the US on behalf of their Pakistani proxies, in August 1971 there was a news flash that India and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) had just signed a bilateral treaty. There was then an immediate media request for an interview on this treaty with the Indian Mission in New York. We could not delay a response and I was asked to go for this interview, though we had not till then received the treaty's text.
I prepared carefully, as best as I could, based on what we knew within the Mission on India's overall policy posture. A main question asked by the media was if this treaty with the USSR affected India's policy of non-alignment. I denied this firmly, non-alignment being a cornerstone of our foreign policy, and on return to office, was glad to find that my position had been in line with the treaty text that had meanwhile arrived.
As the conflict continued, some Bangladesh representatives also came to New York to further their cause in late 1971. I was asked to help them. Some of these visitors later became important figures in independent Bangladesh. One of them was Rehman Sobhan, a friend from our student days, who also wrote about our discussions in his memoirs, published just five years ago. Referring in them to me, he wrote that I “assured him that no action by the UN would frustrate the march of the Indian Army to Dhaka as the Soviet Union had told them of a veto,” in the UN Security Council (UNSC). The situation continued to escalate through the fall, an important and busy time at the UN as this conflict continued. Growing pressure on the Pakistani military from the Mukti Bahini freedom fighter forces in Bangladesh led to a rapidly unfolding end-game in December 1971.
On December 3, the Pakistan air force launched sneak attacks aimed at disabling runways on 12 forward western Indian airbases. The Indian Air Force shrugged this off and established air superiority over East Pakistan. This was a new dimension of a direct military conflict between India and Pakistan, and the matter was further taken up in the UNSC on December 4. There the US delegation, led by George Bush Sr twice proposed ceasefire resolutions, supported by a majority of members, including the People's Republic of China that had just been seated in the UNSC, replacing Taiwan in October (with India's support ironically). A ceasefire would have been severely prejudicial to Bangladesh and India, given the ongoing ground operations of the Indian Army in support of Bangladeshi liberation.
We were not members of the UNSC at the time, but our Ambassador was invited to the session, where I went with him and we lobbied heavily behind the scenes. With Indian support, the USSR insisted that members of the Bangladeshi liberation movement also be invited to the UNSC to present their case and evidence of heinous crimes by the Pakistani army. The ceasefire resolutions were ultimately vetoed by the USSR.
The Soviet veto gave a brief window to the Bangladeshi freedom forces, supported by the Indian Army, to persevere with their goal of liberating their country. As the fighting continued, some days later the UNSC reconvened on December 6 to forward the case to the General Assembly. This time both India and Pakistan sent senior Ministers to represent their positions. From India it was Sardar Swaran Singh, a stalwart Cabinet Minister of the then Congress Government. From Pakistan it was the just-appointed Foreign Minister and leader of the recently-formed Pakistan People's Party, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.
Their exchanges intensified along with the ground conflict now going on more and more against Pakistan. There was also speculation if China would also be drawn further into the debate by the US, with memories in India running high of the 1962 conflict with its northern neighbour.
Three very personal memories of that time have remained with me. The first was of corridor talk, on the margins of the UNSC chamber, about yet another ceasefire resolution, this time by a Soviet ally member, as all other members were getting increasingly concerned about the prolongation of the conflict on the ground and its potential for wider conflict. But before any such eventuality, news also came of the Pakistani forces surrendering to the Indian side on December 17, ending a matter that then seemed rather touch-and-go. The other is of listening to Bhutto's fierce final speech to the UNSC, when he tore up his papers and walked out of the meeting. Some speculated that it was meant more for his home audience and politics rather than the UN where the matter of conflict seemed almost over.
But my most vivid memory is of an encounter with Bhutto himself. I had first heard about him from senior school fellows, some of whom knew of him from their times together at the University of Southern California. I had then met him in the 1960s when I was Deputy Chief of Protocol for India's Ministry of External Affairs and he had come to India for bilateral exchanges. After the final UNSC session on December 16, India's UN Ambassador Samar Sen went to the UN bar-lounge to meet his Pakistani counterpart Agha Shahi. I happened to accompany Sen to this meeting. After some time, we were also joined by Bhutto. Asked to get Bhutto a drink from the bar, I went back there for a glass of Black Dog whiskey (his reputed favourite). As I handed it to him, and sat down, he looked at us and said something that I still remember. “Some forces were opposed to our being together. Otherwise, we would not have been separated. Then I may not have become the Prime Minister but would certainly have been the Foreign Minister of a united India,” he said.
Not much later, Bhutto did become the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and visited India. His meeting with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and their famous Simla Agreement are of course well-known. So is the subsequent history of contacts between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh over the next five decades. During this period, all these three subcontinental neighbours have experienced their own political changes — in Governments, ruling parties and leaders. These also impacted their mutual relations. The memories here recalled and described reflect only one important section of this process. But this description also points to the commonality in their history and culture, in a wider background of time and space, that also deserves present recollection.
The writer is a former diplomat and a translator of Sanskrit classics. The views expressed are personal.
